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Transcript of Remarks
Thanks very much. I also want to add my thanks to the University of Georgia
and the Dean Rusk International Law Center for the invitation to participate, as
well as to Sarah Quinn, in particular, for her extraordinary organization of this
conference.
I am going to broaden the question and my response because I think how we
define the question reveals some of our ethical and normative commitments. I’d
like us to think not just about “global healthcare governance,” as the panel is
titled, but global governance for health. And I’d suggest we think not just in
relation to a narrow understanding of pandemic preparedness but more broadly
in terms of health system resilience.
My short answer to the question that you posed, Fazal, as to why the structures
in place failed to prevent this pandemic, is that it failed because they are manifestly dysfunctional. In contrast to what Ben Mason Meier said, I would say that
this pandemic has not so much “shaken the foundations of global health governance” but rather, it has revealed the foundations of those multilateral governance
structures to be fundamentally colonialist, and the architecture to be neoliberal.
I would argue that we find ourselves in a multilateral order that is very, very far
from the one that we imagined 75 years ago as a guarantor of peace, justice, and
security.1
I want to be clear that I say that as a committed multilateralist. I teach international human rights law and comparative constitutional law relating to health, as
well as being an advocate and practitioner. I’m on a number of World Health
Organization (“WHO”) technical advisory groups, as well as the United Nations
(“UN”) Secretary General’s Independent Accountability Panel for Women’s,
Children’s, and Adolescents’ Health in the Sustainable Development Goals
(“SDGs”) and I work with an organization called Partners in Health, which is a
global health and social justice organization. 2 So, my remarks should be taken
as those of someone who is deeply distressed by the state of affairs that we find
ourselves in. At the same time, I am radically optimistic that we can do more
than tweak around the edges.
I wholeheartedly agree with what Tom Bollyky said, that reforming the IHR,
while important, is not remotely going to approach the sorts of changes that we
actually need for better responses, not just to future pandemics (which invariably
we will face) but to all of the other intersectional threats that we face from climate
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change, from forced migration, and from staggering social inequalities within
and between countries.
So, in my few minutes of remarks, I thought I would borrow from some of the
exchanges between Sandy Levinson and Jack Balkin on democracy and dysfunction3 in our U.S. constitutional framework, which I imagine is required reading
in most constitutional law courses these days.
Levinson and Balkin exchange views on the diagnosis—and therefore remedy—for democratic dysfunction in the U.S. system. Levinson views it as structural, requiring structural fixes. Jack Balkin takes the position of a political scientist, which is that we need more representation more agency to combat what
he calls “constitutional rot.”4 In the context of global governance for health, I
would say that it’s a little bit of both.
On the one hand, there has been a profound de-democratization in global governance over the last twenty to thirty years, which has accelerated since the turn
of the millennium.5 Global governance was never really democratic because it
was always built on a neo-colonialist foundation designed to favor the interests
of the powerful states in the economic North. States were meant to act as principals while international organizations were largely relegated to the role of agents
enacting the preferred agendas of powerful states.6
Nonetheless, encroaching neoliberalism beginning in the 1980s and reforms,
such as the UN Global Compact7 and the signing of the Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors,8 have resulted in philanthro-capitalists, such as the
Gates Foundation—now the second largest donor to the WHO—and corporations, to take a much more prominent role.9 At the same time as the economic
clout of non-state actors grew, the same neoliberal policies that increased private
actors’ private economic power often left states with less fiscal space and public
capital to invest in international organizations—and global health.10 Thus, it is
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not a surprise that assessed commitments have perpetually declined while ‘voluntary contributions’ have increased as a percentage of the budgets of WHO and
other international organizations.
These trends are deeply related to the reasons why the International Health
Regulations (IHR) have been largely irrelevant to state actions in this pandemic
and why the WHO does not have the kind of authority to make decisions that
some of my colleagues seem to think it has—and which I would like it to have.
That is, we can think about governance in a very kind of simplistic reductionist
way as who decides, based on what criteria, and what are the distributional consequences and accountability for those decisions. Thus, at a very basic level, the
fact that there is much less centralized funding means fragmented authority for
decision-making, and fragmented initiatives.
The fragmentation of the agendas has unquestionably exacerbated vertical, siloed programming among programs within the WHO—and among different
agencies implementing development agendas. We learned from the Millennium
Development Goals that these vertical programs are unfit for the purpose of
building health systems, even if greater sums are added to HIV/AIDS programs
or TB programs.11 Even if the Sustainable Development Goals now calls for Universal Health Coverage, the global governance for health functions is illequipped to meet the systemic challenges to UHC (and pandemic preparedness),
much less to address these protracted-entrenched, multi-sectoral problems such
as climate justice.
It is also extremely difficult in the baroque architecture of global health to
trace accountability relationships.12 For example, WHO may fund GAVI, the
Global Vaccine Alliance, or UNAIDS for some things; GAVI may receive funding from the Gates Foundation which then goes to the WHO. Trying to disentangle the sources, channels and outcomes in global health is rather like looking at
a Bryce Marden painting where you can’t really figure out where one thread
starts and another stops. In turn, this makes meaningful accountability near impossible under current governance structures.
The dependence of the WHO (and other institutions) on philanthropic, corporate, and governmental largesse to fund it leads to the WHO finding itself needing to be obsequious to its largest donors. Tom Bollyky already alluded to the
question of WHO’s suboptimal transparency with respect to China’s behavior
early on in the pandemic. But China is far from a unique example. Another notorious example that has emerged is the one in which the person who was in
charge of pandemic preparedness in Italy from about 2011 to 2015 later moved
11
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to the WHO and then was seconded back to Italy to assess its performance during
the early stage of the pandemic, which ended up in falsified reports among other
things.13 There are numerous examples of conflicts of interest and problems that
have emerged from the WHO being so beholden to its large donors (both certain
states and also private actors). These are the circumstances that deform the
agenda global health, far beyond but including setting the stage for poor performance in pandemics.
Beyond fixing ‘rot’ within different organizations, some of the problems that
led to failure in COVID (and beyond) require structural changes. In my view,
these are rooted in global economic governance norms that go way beyond the
IHR reform. That is, as taxation rules have evolved to favor private capital over
preserving public fiscal space, rigid interpretations of intellectual property have
been encoded in trade agreements, financial deregulation has made for enormous
volatility in the ability states exercise control over their economic and health policies; and countries across the global south have been crippled by debt and austerity, it has affected both the capacity of states to address their national health
systems and public health, as well as global governance for health.14 What we
are seeing now with the COVID-19 vaccine debacle is not just a crisis of global
health governance, but a result of decades of decision-making processes favoring
corporate claims to intellectual property over global public goods. It is also the
culmination of the growing and outsized influence of the Gates Foundation in
having global institutions turn to a system based on private pharmaceutical IP
holders (COVAX) versus a technology access pool (C-TAP).15 These are the
rules that shackle and limit supply of health technologies, which desperately need
to be expanded in the face of a global pandemic. As time is short, I very much
hope we can talk about this in the discussion.
In my view, the inflection point caused by this sweeping pandemic requires
far more than tinkering with the IHR. It calls on us to re-think these fundamental
rules that create the architecture of global governance for health. If these legal
regimes can evolve in one direction, they can also be modified in other directions
that advance of more just political economy in global health. We have seen transformative change before, for example after HIV/AIDS. We must not waste the
opportunity forged by this ravaging crisis to rethink what is required to
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democratize global governance for health more broadly than IHR reform or pandemic preparedness.

